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Abstract
Monetary policy has differential effects throughout the United States. When set-
ting monetary policy, central banks must consider how national and regional economic
goals are being achieved. In this study, the methods and evidence are focused on using
structural VAR analysis, assuming that the United States has an interest rate channel
of monetary policy. The methods estimate the symmetry and magnitude of monetary
shocks on income, unemployment and prices in major metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) of the United States as compared to the national effects. As in Carlino and
Defina (1998) and Florio (2005), differential regional effects connect to optimal currency
areas (OCA) literature, the advent of the Euro, increased regionalism, and the possi-
bility of more monetary unions forming worldwide. Events in early 2010 concerning
the Euro’s stability show the importance of monitoring regions and their reactions to
policy.
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1 Introduction
Is Federal Reserve policy optimal in distributing its effects across the United States?
From this short overview of price, unemployment and income per capita data from
U.S. cities, it is intuitive that a single monetary policy across a federation of city-states
will result in suboptimal responses for some city economies while helping others. A
variation of the New Keynesian model shows how economists can analyze cities in the
same way they analyze small countries; we assume relatively large metropolitan areas
in the United States are much like countries in a monetary union. Each city experiences
different inflation reactions, which may affect local, real interest rates. Some U.S. cities
and regions may want more price and wage inflation, and the subsequent growth that
comes from a monetary expansion, while other cities may not want inflation as an
opportunity cost of growth. However, the same monetary policy is faced by all these
”city-states” in such a union, which makes differential effects important.
In a similar way to Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999), this study looks at vector
autoregressions and impulse responses functions to identify differential effects. It is
intuitive that differences exist; the magnitude and timing of those differences is critical
to understanding monetary policy transmission mechanisms. It is possible that credit
markets are different from city to city or labor markets are different such that the
aggregate supply curvature is different for each municipality; policy effects can be very
detrimental to one city versus another while aimed at the optimization of a national
objective function. This, once again, puts into question optimal currency areas a la
Mundell (1961).
Section 2 of this study provides an overview of the New Keynesian framework for
this analysis and a brief discussion of the data. Section 3 describes the methodology
for the vector autoregressions and impulse response functions, while Section 4 discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Data and Regional Overview
Carlino and DeFina (1998) shows there is quite a degree of heterogeneity across the eight
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions. They highlight three main contributors
to the source of regional idiosyncratic responses to monetary policy: i. the mix of
interest-sensitive industries; ii. mix of large and small firms; and iii. idiosyncratic
banking regulations.
Part of these differences, the location of industries, is due to historical ‘accident’.
For example, Detroit, MI, in the Great Lakes region, was more or less midway between
the coal fields and steel production and thus became a leader in automobile production.
The Midwest region grew into an agricultural powerhouse.
The mix of small and large firms can be explained by thick market externalities,
spatial agglomeration, and firms ‘voting with their feet’. Carlino and DeFina (1998)
demonstrate the smallest percentage of small firms can be found in New England and the
Great Lakes regions; the Rocky Mountain region and Far West have the largest share.
Because small firms have less access to capital markets and rely more on loans as a source
of credit, states in these regions are more susceptible to interest rate fluctuations.
Finally, differences in banking regulations of, particularly, smaller banks may restrict
flows of credit and sources of deposits. Clearly, the growth of interstate banking has
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reduced differences in credit possibilities; in regions with relatively large numbers of
rural residents, it is less costly for firms to borrow from regional banks.
To examine macroeconomic differences, we first consider city-specific unemployment
inflation and income composition.1 Figures 1 – 5 show the differences which exist across
cities. All the data presented is the average over the period 2000-2008. Figure 1 shows
the difference between city j, and the national average of inflation, p¯ij − p¯iUS and the
standard deviation of this difference as a measure of inflation differential volatility. As
can be clearly seen, there is about a one-percent difference between the highest inflation
city (Seattle) and the lowest one (St. Louis). The average difference between the highest
and lowest inflation cities over the sample period was about 5%. A word of caution:
this does not mean that Seattle and St. Louis have the highest and lowest price levels
over the period, simply price changes. Looking at this data it appears the national
inflation average is closest to Philadelphia. All data have been seasonally adjusted.
Figure 1: City Inflation Difference
Figure 2 shows the same for unemployment rates across US cities: u¯j − u¯US . Given
frictions in individual labor markets we can see there is a considerable difference be-
tween the highest unemployment city (Detroit) and the lowest (Honolulu), about 3%.
The average difference between the highest and lowest unemployment cities over the
sample period was about 5%. Visually, it appears the national average is closest to
Pittsburgh. As might be expected, cities with the most volatility are those with largest
unemployment difference. It is interesting to note Portland’s unemployment standard
deviation, which is quite high. Generally, Portland’s unemployment is very close to the
US as a whole; however, the recession of 2001 hit Portland particularly hard, and its
unemployment rose two percentage points above the nation’s in 2002-03.
1The cities are listed in their respective BLS regions: West: Seattle (SEA), San Francisco (SFO), San
Diego (SDO), Portland (POR), Los Angeles (LAX), Honolulu (HON), Denver (DEN), Anchorage (ANC);
Midwest: St. Louis (STL), Minneapolis (MIN), Milwaukee (MIL), Kansas City (KCM), Detroit (DET),
Cleveland (CLE), Cincinnati (CIN), Chicago (CHI); South: Miami (MIA), Houston (HOU) Dallas-Ft.
Worth (DFW), Atlanta (ATL); East: Pittsburgh (PIT), New York City (NYC), Philadelphia (PHI), Boston
(BOS).
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Figure 2: City Unemployment Rate Difference
Now we turn our attention to the composition of production. Figures 3 and 4 show
the output shares for private goods and services, percentages shown are the goods share,
for the Northeast and Midwest, Figure 3, and the South andWest, Figure 4 – the regions
are split into the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) regions, for the period 2001-2008.2
We also show the average for each region. The goods average for the Northeast and
Midwest are about 21.0% and 8.2% respectively. Considering the South and West in
Figure 4 the service goods are almost the same 16.7% and 16.8%. Unsurprisingly, given
industry and agriculture, the Midwest produces the highest percentage of goods. We
also see considerable differences between cities, even within the same state; for example,
in San Francisco the goods share is almost under six percent, while in San Diego it is
22.5%.
Figure 5 shows the percentage difference of the goods share of each city (actual data
is at the county level) vis-a´-vis the US average: ln(yServicesj /y
Services
US ) for the period
2001 – 08.3 As can be seen, the majority of cities produces less goods than the US, with
the closest cities to the national average being Houston and St. Louis. What is also
striking is that the majority of large US cities produce less than the national average –
the national average is for all cities, not just the cities in our sample. The theory below
provides a model to understand why monetary policy may have differential effects.
3 Theory
Consider an international version of a New Keynesian business-cycle model. Rather
than look at the propagation of business cycles across nations, we examine a “city-
state” rendering of the model, with a home city and all others. We assume that each
2The BLS adopted the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for classifying business
types and started presenting business classifications in 2001, hence, for this comparison, we rely on data from
2001 on. The BLS regions are used because the price and income per capita data come from BLS.
3See Footnote 2.
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Figure 3: Share of Income Northeast and Midwest
city is ‘small’ and it trades with all other cities which combined become as a homogenous
‘foreign’ city. For any variable xt, we will denote home city, denoted j, variables as
xt = xj,t and foreign variables x∗t = x−j,t, that is all cities other than j. Because
the home city is small, x∗t can be understood as the ‘national average’ of variable
x. Another assumption of such an economy is perfect capital mobility, such that the
nominal interest rate will be the same across all city-states. What is also implied is that
residents of city states are citizens of a single nation and, therefore, put their savings
in a single instrument, say a federal government bond.
A conclusion we can draw from the data is that a number of ‘small open macroe-
conomies’ exist, each with its own idiosyncratic, macroeconomic fluctuations. We em-
ploy a New Keynesian model based on Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertner (2001). Domestic
household consumption, ct, is a CES composite of home and foreign produced goods
ct = (1− γ)cht + γcft , γ ≥ 0 (1)
where cht (c
f
t ) is the amount of domestic consumption of home (foreign, or imported)
produced goods and γ is a measure of openness, or as the percentage of foreign-produced
goods in the domestic consumption basket. We can think of domestically-produced
goods as non-traded goods and services, nationwide the percentage of services in the
household expenditures is about 65%.
Domestic output is divided between home and foreign consumption of domestic
goods, ch∗t , or
yt = (1− γ)cht + γch∗t . (2)
The household maximizes its intertemporal utility, a function of the composite con-
sumption good and leisure, `t,
U = Et
T∑
t=0
βtu(ct, `t) (3)
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Figure 4: Share of Income South and West
subject to an appropriate budget constraint. In this model, an implicit assumption
is perfect intercity risk-sharing, a fair assumption as all the ‘countries’ are in a single
currency area. We have the first-order conditions, in log-linear form,
cht − cft = ηqt, (4)
wt − pt − γqt = (φnt + σct) + µw, (5)
∆cet+1 =
1
σ
[(i∗t − piet+1) + ρ−∆qet+1)] (6)
and
∆qet+1 = (i
∗
t − piet+1)− (i∗t − pi∗et+1) (7)
where for any variable xt, xet+1 = Etxt+1; ρ = lnβ; and qt = p
∗
t − pt is the relative price
of the home to foreign cities price levels. 4
Equation (4) is the marginal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign
produced goods where η is the elasticity of substitution. Equation (5) is the relationship
between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution for consumption and labor,
where nt = 1 − `t is labor, φ is the inverse of labor supply elasticity, σ is the risk
aversion parameter, and µw is a wage friction, or mark-up (for example, long term
wage contracts) which distorts the wage from its long-run equilibrium.
Equation (6) is a standard Euler equation, which shows the relationship between
consumption and returns to savings. We think of this in terms of returns to home bonds,
which is given by the expected real interest rate, ret = i
∗
t − piet+1, under the assumption
of perfect capital and asset mobility, it = i∗t , the city nominal interest rates are equal.
Note, however, because pit 6= pi∗t the real interest rate across cities differs, which will
4From the CES utility function, we can write the price level as, in log form, p = γpT + (1− γ)pN where
pT /pN is the traded/nontraded goods price. If p∗T = pT , q = (1− γ)(p∗N − pT ) 6= 0 which can be interpreted
as a Balassa-Samuelson type relative price wedge.
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Figure 5: Share of City Goods Income Relative to National Average
affect consumption behavior across cities according to equation (6). Finally, equation
(7), is a version of the terms of trade, uncovered interest parity condition. Nominal
interest rates remain for the time being to remind the reader that real interest rates vary
across cities. We assume that, under assumptions of risk sharing and the stationarity
of shocks in the long run, that intercity PPP holds such that limt→∞ qt → Q 6= 0, see
Footnote 4 above, and thus equation (7) holds. The city ‘real exchange rate’ or terms
of trade – this result comes from the fact that the implicit exchange rate between all
cities is one.
Next, we turn our attention to foreign demand for home-traded goods. Given that
the rest of the country is large relative to each city, the home city’s share of production
exported is negligible. From Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) we assume that, for all other
cities, output is equal to domestic consumption, y∗ = c∗ and national inflation, that
is not influenced by the home city’s rate of inflation. The foreign demand for home
production depends on foreign output and the terms of trade
ch∗t = y
∗
t + ηqt. (8)
We have assumed the elasticity of substitution is the same as in the home city – given
the relative homogeneity of cities within a country, this a fair assumption. Given these
assumptions, we can write the national Euler equation which shows the real interest
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rate is proportional to output growth
i∗t − pi∗et+1 = σ(y∗t+1 − y∗t ) (9)
where national output growth is taken to be exogenous to a specific city’s economic
activity.
We consider a linear production function for all goods that is homogeneous of degree
one in labor only
yt = at + nt, (10)
at is a productivity shock. With monopolistic, price-setting behavior, each city’s firms
base their pricing behavior on expected price changes and marginal cost. In the aggre-
gate, the overall inflation rate is derived from a modified New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC) as
pit = zpi∗et+1 + δ(wt − pt − at) (11)
where the term in parenthesis is the marginal cost of production, derived from cost
minimization. The textbook version of the NKPC uses the output gap, however Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005) demonstrate that substituting marginal cost for the gap has better
empirical success. Note that city firms base their pricing behavior on the national
average inflation rate rather than city-specific ones. Because of the high degree of
mobility for consumption goods, firms are less willing to put their prices at a competitive
disadvantage with other city firms. However, each city faces different labor markets;
therefore, the marginal cost of production varies across cities resulting in idiosyncratic
inflation rates.
Define x¯ to be the steady-state or equilibrium level of variable x. Specifically, let y¯
be the natural rate of output, yˆ = y − y¯ is the output gap. We can solve the model as:
yˆt = yˆet+1 −
1 + θ
σ
(ret+1 − r¯t) + ζt (12)
pit = zpi∗et+1 + λθyˆt + ut (13)
qt =
σ
1 + θ
yˆt + q¯t (14)
where θ = γ(ση − 1)(2 − γ); α = (σ/(1 + θ + φ); λθ = αδ and ut = δµwt ; and ζt is
a stationary demand shock which can be decomposed into city-specific and national
components: ζt = ζj,t + sjζ∗t , sj is a measure of city j’s idiosyncratic response to a
nationwide shock. The steady states are given by:
y¯t = α[(1 + φ)at − σθκy∗t ]
r¯t = θκr∗t + σκ(y¯
e
t+1 − y¯t)
q¯t = σκ(y¯t − y∗t )
with κ = (1 + θ)−1.
Equation (12) is a city-specific IS curve relating the current output gap to the
expected gap and inversely related to the real interest rate. As is standard, we see an
increase in the nominal interest, assuming price stickiness, increases the real interest rate
reducing AD as consumers increase savings. Equation (13) is the short run aggregate
supply (AS) curve that relates city inflation to expected inflation, the output gap and
cost-push inflation.
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Equation (14) states that a city’s terms of trade are positively related to the output
gap and the long-run terms of trade. We might also expect that city relative prices
should converge in the long run, that is q¯t = 0, but we can see that the steady-state
terms of trade is not equal to zero. In the intercity relative price literature, there is
considerable evidence showing persistent differences in city-specific terms of trade (e.g.
Cecchetti, Mark, and Sonora, 2002). Indeed, this equation resembles Kravis and Lipsey
(1983) demand function – persistent price differences can be explained by city-specific
productivity differences or income and preference differences, and thus relative prices
converge to some non-zero mean.
3.1 Policy Rule
To close the model, we need to consider some interest rate or monetary policy rule.
The standard way is to identify a monetary loss function based on some relationship
between inflation and the output gap (or unemployment). With differences in city
relative prices, or terms of trade, policy differs from a single, closed-economy model.
However, as the terms of trade in equation (14) are proportional to the output gap, the
policy objective can be written in the standard loss function form.
We begin with the assumption that each city loss function differs due to idiosyn-
cratic macroeconomic conditions. For example, Detroit may be willing to take on more
inflation to reduce its above-average unemployment while high inflation cities such as
Seattle, would prefer the opposite. Thus, there exists tension between these two cities
if the federal monetary authority favors one city over the other.
Hefeker (2003) considers such a case. Define the period, city-specific loss function
as
L = b(nt − n¯t)2 + pi2t , b > 0 (15)
where n¯ is the natural rate of employment, or, alternatively, an employment target,
and b reflects the city central bank’s preferences. Let employment be driven by
nt = c(pit − piet+1) + ²+ dξ∗ (16)
thus, employment, in the short run can be driven by inflationary surprises if wages are
fixed for a period. ² is a city-specific, idiosyncratic shock, and ξ∗ is a nationwide shock,
d > 0 measures the city’s idiosyncratic response to that national shock.
With a single monetary authority, the central bank minimizes the nationwide analog
to equation (15) as
L∗ = b∗(n∗t − n¯∗t )2 + pi∗2t , b∗ > 0, (17)
similarly
n∗t = c
∗(pi∗t − pi∗et+1) + ²¯+ ξ∗ (18)
where ²¯ =
∑k hj², n¯∗ =∑k hjn¯,∑hj = 1 for the k cities, hj < 1 is relative weight of
each city, and
∑k hj = 1.
Minimizing equation(15) subject to (16) we get optimal inflation in the jth city
pi = Γ[n¯− (²+ dξ∗)] (19)
where Γ = bc/(1 + bc2). A similar result comes from minimizing equation (17) subject
to equation (18). As pointed out in Hefeker (2003), however, the decision by a central
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monetary authority is made based on the median governor, therefore the country’s
optimal inflation is determined by this policy maker,
pim = Γm[n¯m − (²m + dmξ∗)] (20)
where the m subscript denotes the median outcome with the associated preferences.
Combining equations (19) and (20) with (15) we get a city specific welfare loss of a
decision made by the median policy maker
L(M) = bi[(Γ− 1)n¯+ (1− c)(²+ dξ∗)]2 +
(
Γm[n¯m − (²m + dmξ∗)]
)2 (21)
where L(M) is the city loss function associated with the decision made by the me-
dian governor. Thus, the individual city loss function differs from the one employed
nationally and thus implies a suboptimal, to the city, Taylor rule.
If each city were to design a Taylor rule, say,
rt = r¯ + fj(pit − p¯iτt ) + yˆt, (22)
fj is the city bank’s inflation weight and p¯iτ is the countrywide inflation target, and
compare this to a similarly constructed median (central bank’s) governor’s Taylor rule
rm,t = r¯ + fm(pi∗t − p¯iτt ) + yˆ∗t (23)
we would see a difference in the policy interest rate as
rt = rm,t + χt, (24)
where χt = (fjpit−fmpi∗t )+(yˆt− yˆ∗t ) is a suboptimal policy premium. Note, even if city
preferences were identical to the central bank’s preferences, f ≡ fi = fm, the policy
interest premium would still differ across cities because of heterogeneous inflation and
output gaps, with χt 6= 0. Under the assumption fi = fm, combining equations (12)
and (24) we get the city aggregate demand curve
yˆt = δ′ + (1− δ)yet+1 − δf(piet+1 − pi∗et+1) + ψt (25)
with δ′ = −δrem,t+1 and ψt = δy∗et+1 + ζt.
4 Empirical Methodology
The major metropolitan areas identified above have data available to investigate the
hypothesis that U.S. cities experience differential effects from monetary policy. Mon-
etary policy should have effects on income per capita, prices and unemployment that
differ from city to city5. Cities are used to not only complement the effects shown in
Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999) that interest-sensitive regions of the United States face
larger effects of monetary policy than other regions, but introduce data on inflation into
this regional policy literature.
5Some studies, such as Karras (1996) have characterized this as monetary policy pushing on a string ;
because credit market imperfections exist, a contractionary shock has different effects than an expansionary
shock (Florio (2005)). There may be regional differences in AS curvature that may signal credit market
imperfections in one area more than others. Barro (1977) used a modified two-stage least squares analysis
to first derive the unanticipated contractionary and expansionary shocks to policy, then use those shocks as
explanatory variables in the second stage concerning both income growth and inflation.
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4.1 Estimation Data and Variables
Turning our attention to city macroeconomic data, we can see the manifestation of
these differences in income data, but also in unemployment and price data. The data
we consider are semi-annual. City specific output data at a higher frequency is not
available. All city data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov) and in-
cludes city-specific income per capita, unemployment, and prices. The federal funds
data is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (www.federalreserve.gov).
As previously suggested, considerable differences across cities exist; for a host of rea-
sons, city-specific inflation, income per capita (as a proxy for city output levels) and
unemployment experience heterogeneous responses to a single monetary shock with
respect to the national reaction. Additionally, a change in monetary policy reflects a
median governor which may benefit cities at the distribution’s center but hurt those in
the tails.
Monetary policy is characterized by changes in the federal funds rate (ffr).6. These
monthly data are converted into a semi-annual series using a 6-month centered moving
average. The data on unemployment rates are at the municipal level, which is also
true for prices and income. These data are also converted to a semi-annual frequency;
population was also found at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to normalize income
measurements to per-capita figures. This conversion reduces the possibility of spurious
correlations based on the sheer size of large cities in comparison to small cities. All
these series have potential nonstationarity in either their levels or their first differences
for some subset of the municipalities. Because we are ultimately testing for deviations
from the national movements in these variables, the data on prices, unemployment and
income per capita are made into a ratio with their national counterpart. For each home
city j in our data, the variables are as follows:
Pj =
Pj
PUS
; and Uj =
Uj
UUS
; and WPCj =
(Inc/Cap)j
(Inc/Cap)US
The labeling in the results below needs some explanation. For example, the variable
PANC refers to the ratio of the inflation rates in Anchorage, Alaska to the U.S. inflation
rate for urban areas. UANC and WPCANC are the example variables for Anchorage for
unemployment and income per capita respectively. Each city’s ratios with the national
level are stationary for all data at the 5% level of both Phillip-Perron and Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests.
We assume a change in ffr is exogenous to the determination of the other variables.
The figures below describe how the path of these ratios change when monetary policy
takes place. In this study, there are four variables, 24 cities, and 38 observations of
each variable for city i from 1990 to 2008.
4.2 Vector Autoregressions
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) are a standard econometric method used when test-
ing hypotheses concerning policy effects on macroeconomic variables. Similar to error
correction models, VARs regress a vector of variables at time t on the same vector of
6Morgan (1993) uses the federal funds rate as the monetary indicator rather than a monetary aggregate;
see Morgan (1993), Florio (2005) for a discussion on the use of interbank lending rates versus monetary
aggregates as a way to represent policy shocks.
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variables with a distributed lag structure and perhaps other variables assumed to be
exogenous to the vector of focal variables. The lag structure is determined by informa-
tion criteria, where the Akaike and Schwarz Criteria are examples. The error term in
such an estimation is considered to be a vector of uncorrelated, zero-mean innovations
to the variables within the original vector. Such a model allows for an impulse response
analysis by simulating a change in one variable’s disturbances and examining how that
would change the relationships among the other variables through a distributed lag.
The AS and AD equations, (13) and (25), formalize the VAR analysis. Equation (26)
describes the vector of variables for this study; in this analysis, we study the dynamic
behavior of 24 metropolitan-level vectors, assumed to be covariance stationary, with six
variables each.
Yi,t = (ffrt, Pi,t, Ui,t,WPCi,t,Zt) (26)
The index t is time and i represents the index over the 24 cities in our sample. Z
represents a vector of other, exogenous variables. Following Carlino and Defina’s (1998,
1999) studies, the use of the leading indicator from the Conference Board (LEAD)
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ producer price index for fuel prices (PPIFUELS)
as exogenous variables provides aggregate demand (LEAD) and supply (PPIFUELS)
variables for identification. The VAR and the dynamics of our choice variables are
described in equation (27).
AYi,t = B(L)Yi,t−p + εi,t (27)
In equation (27), A is a (6 × 6) matrix of correlation coefficients for the variables in
Y; B is a (6 × 6) matrix represents the polynomial relationships describing the lag
operator L and ε is the vector of disturbances. We restrict the variance-covariance
matrix to force the exogenous variables LEAD and PPIFUELS to be exogenous and
have no contemporaneous correlations. In the reduced form model, the disturbances
would be converted to υ, which is simply the product of the inverse of the A matrix in
equation (26) and the structural disturbances, ε.
5 Results
5.1 Impulse Response Functions
VARs recognize the relationship between past and current values of the same variables
and the potential for bidirectional causality7. For example, monetary policy may both
cause and be caused by changes in income, inflation or unemployment. In our model,
we assume that current and lagged values of the federal funds rate determine inflation,
unemployment and income levels at the national and metropolitan levels. The VAR
residuals allow us to analyze an impulse response function (IRF). In our model, the
“impulse ”is a monetary policy change acting like an unanticipated shock; the response
is how the three endogenous variables react to the specific impulse, a one standard-
deviation increase in the federal funds rate. The IRF methodology implies that a rate
7Sims (1980) is seen as the beginning of this literature, but Greene (2003), Chapter 19, has an expanded
discussion
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cut would simply be the mirror image of the increase8. Table 1 summarizes how to
interpret the impulse responses.
Table 1: Impulse Response Summary: A one standard deviation increase in ffr
Change in
variable Pi Ui WPCi
↑ PUS falling faster than Pi Ui rising faster than UUS WPCUS falling
faster than WPCi
↓ Pi falling faster than PUS UUS rising faster than Ui WPCi falling
faster than WPCUS
We begin by considering the period-by-period impulse response results for ten pe-
riods (five years) in Tables 2 – 4. As can be seen, there is considerable heterogeneity
of the responses across the cities. Moreover, the timing of the direction and speed of
adjustment varies across the cities – and tends to cluster over the ten periods of impulse
response. For example, consider Chicago in Table 2, the national average unemploy-
ment rate rises faster following a shock, however, this is reversed after four years. The
opposite trend occurs with respect to income, which is due to the Okun effect. On the
other hand, prices generally rise faster in Chicago vis-a´-vis the overall CPI. Looking
at Cincinnati, next to Chicago in the table, its income falls every period following the
shock, except for period 10, while unemployment initially rises and then falls relative
to the average. Also, a weaker negative relationship between unemployment and per
capita income. From this side-by-side comparison, it appears Chicago fares better than
Cincinnati following a monetary shock as a ”macroeconomy”.
Next, consider the cumulative impulse responses shown in Figures 6 through 13. We
should evaluate the results in terms of the differential effects of monetary policy across
the United States. When there is a monetary shock, we would expect the included
variables to react according to theory. For income per capita, we would expect an
increase in the federal funds rate to reduce income growth; for inflation, we expect a
slowdown also, and for unemployment we expect an increase. Because our variables
are deviations from the national response, or how differently the home city’s reacts to
a national monetary policy relative to the national reaction.
An example helps illustrate the results. In Figure 6, for example, the results for
Atlanta (ATL) are in the middle row of 6. The monetary contraction initially increases
prices more than the change in the national level, increases unemployment in net more
than at the national level, and decreases wages versus the national level. After four
or five time periods, two years after the initial shock, the regional change is more like
the national change; the ratio converges or begins converging after ten periods. In
contrast, Boston (BOS) in 6, does not converge in any of the variables. The monetary
8Jo´rda (2005)suggests a different way to use IRFs, especially when there are panel data to be examined,
which is related to two-stage regressions a la Barro (1977, 1978).
13
Table 2: Impulse Responses to a one std dev change in ffr: Prices, Unemployment and
Income/Capita
ANC ATL BOS
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 -0.139 0.172 -0.224 -0.077 0.192 -0.009 -0.222 0.073 -0.128
2 -0.268 0.229 -0.220 -0.027 0.151 -0.018 -0.138 0.083 -0.055
3 -0.249 0.085 -0.510 0.207 0.035 -0.118 -0.092 0.009 0.001
4 -0.083 0.034 -0.403 0.227 -0.043 -0.017 -0.107 -0.022 0.028
5 0.017 -0.041 -0.311 0.007 -0.062 0.003 -0.059 -0.032 -0.117
6 0.051 -0.063 -0.162 -0.149 -0.076 0.056 -0.001 -0.018 -0.151
7 0.058 -0.061 -0.048 -0.108 -0.090 0.024 0.029 -0.008 -0.201
8 0.059 -0.045 0.021 -0.029 -0.078 0.070 0.014 0.007 -0.176
9 0.048 -0.025 0.049 -0.033 -0.037 0.060 -0.001 0.007 -0.156
10 0.020 -0.003 0.039 -0.058 0.001 0.071 -0.011 0.002 -0.093
CHI CIN CLE
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 -0.082 -0.055 -0.028 0.022 0.171 -0.294 -0.063 0.137 -0.029
2 0.003 -0.089 0.084 0.143 0.163 -0.097 -0.003 0.095 0.153
3 0.031 -0.158 0.046 0.008 0.055 -0.376 0.088 0.051 -0.109
4 0.002 -0.155 0.047 -0.033 0.049 -0.245 0.102 0.019 0.001
5 0.012 -0.098 0.042 -0.016 -0.017 -0.256 -0.043 -0.026 -0.053
6 0.054 -0.049 -0.002 0.019 -0.039 -0.136 -0.144 -0.029 -0.043
7 0.046 -0.002 -0.025 -0.004 -0.054 -0.107 -0.118 -0.025 -0.045
8 0.003 0.042 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 -0.056 -0.012 -0.012 -0.001
9 -0.011 0.058 -0.060 -0.062 -0.035 -0.026 0.050 -0.001 0.040
10 -0.001 0.051 -0.069 -0.041 -0.020 0.014 0.029 0.008 0.067
DEN DET DFW
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 0.137 0.029 -0.215 0.021 0.034 0.086 0.229 0.024 -0.040
2 0.292 -0.106 0.075 0.042 -0.057 0.139 0.087 0.022 0.057
3 0.331 -0.166 -0.162 0.016 0.017 -0.053 -0.068 -0.078 -0.054
4 0.287 -0.1898 0.010 -0.036 0.033 -0.111 -0.049 -0.137 -0.015
5 0.136 -0.178 -0.042 -0.052 0.038 -0.281 0.023 -0.111 -0.014
6 0.022 -0.136 0.093 -0.026 0.020 -0.166 0.021 -0.064 0.094
7 -0.037 -0.081 0.086 0.018 -0.007 -0.112 0.014 -0.042 0.093
8 -0.026 -0.021 0.105 0.039 -0.022 0.042 0.028 -0.031 0.131
9 0.001 0.033 0.020 0.033 -0.033 0.083 0.045 -0.018 0.090
10 0.017 0.073 -0.047 0.011 -0.033 0.134 0.025 -0.008 0.104
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Table 3: Impulse Responses to a one std dev change in ffr: Prices, Unemployment and
Income/Capita
HON HOU KCM
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 0.094 0.022 0.001 -0.189 0.132 -0.002 0.117 0.054 0.001
2 -0.053 0.074 0.043 -0.011 0.094 0.300 0.131 0.084 0.064
3 0.052 0.089 -0.070 0.072 -0.098 0.064 0.158 0.060 0.063
4 0.164 0.051 -0.114 -0.131 -0.165 0.352 0.148 -0.033 -0.008
5 0.054 -0.016 -0.026 -0.202 -0.229 0.176 0.101 -0.099 -0.015
6 -0.077 -0.074 0.044 -0.160 -0.138 0.210 0.034 -0.128 -0.016
7 -0.061 -0.085 0.076 0.022 -0.055 0.046 -0.004 -0.109 0.018
8 -0.015 -0.072 0.090 0.103 0.053 -0.002 -0.010 -0.074 0.043
9 -0.025 -0.055 0.097 0.134 0.106 -0.096 0.004 -0.035 0.065
10 -0.046 -0.036 0.089 0.096 0.131 -0.122 0.017 -0.004 0.070
LAX MIA MIL
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 0.009 0.056 -0.023 0.143 0.169 -0.015 0.089 -0.001 -0.041
2 -0.104 0.077 -0.146 0.123 0.054 0.115 -0.001 0.023 0.053
3 -0.132 -0.009 -0.065 0.248 -0.061 -0.132 -0.027 -0.016 -0.095
4 -0.0869 -0.087 -0.072 0.090 0.045 -0.131 -0.052 -0.030 -0.116
5 0.002 -0.105 -0.015 -0.147 0.122 -0.308 -0.0718 -0.081 -0.133
6 0.094 -0.088 -0.052 -0.269 0.092 -0.274 -0.035 -0.103 -0.107
7 0.125 -0.044 -0.033 -0.224 0.043 -0.286 0.029 -0.093 -0.075
8 0.104 -0.001 -0.055 -0.195 0.044 -0.187 0.075 -0.067 -0.034
9 0.050 0.026 -0.031 -0.154 0.030 -0.150 0.082 -0.049 -0.002
10 -0.001 0.028 -0.033 -0.086 -0.009 -0.070 0.063 -0.045 0.020
MIN NYC PHI
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 -0.030 0.052 -0.168 -0.059 0.078 0.085 -0.028 0.046 -0.026
2 -0.198 0.073 -0.090 -0.122 0.017 0.168 0.042 0.137 -0.080
3 -0.142 0.076 -0.246 -0.160 -0.056 0.288 -0.029 0.027 -0.216
4 -0.005 0.045 -0.140 -0.130 -0.072 0.206 -0.190 -0.004 -0.191
5 0.087 -0.001 -0.174 -0.061 -0.064 0.162 -0.168 -0.013 -0.141
6 0.093 -0.035 -0.051 -0.005 -0.037 0.001 -0.038 -0.055 -0.109
7 0.057 -0.059 -0.051 0.033 0.001 -0.044 0.029 -0.061 -0.062
8 0.016 -0.067 0.028 0.057 0.045 -0.135 0.026 -0.036 -0.021
9 -0.004 -0.066 0.013 0.057 0.078 -0.108 0.011 -0.017 -0.003
10 -0.011 -0.056 0.046 0.037 0.090 -0.121 0.007 -0.009 0.007
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Table 4: Impulse Responses to a one std dev change in ffr: Prices, Unemployment and
Income/Capita
PIT POR SDO
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 0.036 0.054 -0.098 0.140 0.013 -0.043 -0.050 -0.082 0.054
2 0.123 0.128 -0.035 -0.021 -0.140 0.241 -0.135 -0.233 0.099
3 0.082 0.017 -0.030 -0.027 -0.129 0.048 -0.234 -0.283 0.111
4 -0.042 -0.076 -0.005 0.086 -0.035 0.066 -0.202 -0.272 0.067
5 -0.088 -0.130 -0.028 0.122 0.009 0.010 -0.124 -0.206 0.024
6 -0.070 -0.136 -0.060 0.067 0.036 0.001 -0.065 -0.096 0.000
7 -0.036 -0.112 -0.056 -0.001 0.051 -0.051 -0.038 0.026 0.013
8 -0.010 -0.078 -0.021 -0.026 0.066 -0.078 -0.036 0.122 0.054
9 0.007 -0.041 0.015 -0.027 0.066 -0.093 -0.054 0.167 0.112
10 0.019 -0.005 0.038 -0.027 0.052 -0.088 -0.089 0.161 0.171
SEA SFO STL
Period P U WPC P U WPC P U WPC
1 -0.070 -0.040 0.040 -0.057 0.06336 -0.094 -0.072 0.036 -0.053
2 -0.021 -0.082 -0.093 -0.009 0.07268 0.315 -0.003 0.083 0.021
3 0.191 -0.114 -0.252 0.208 -0.03289 0.254 -0.071 0.067 0.080
4 0.290 -0.157 -0.307 0.245 -0.03714 -0.064 -0.181 0.027 0.049
5 0.273 -0.190 -0.309 0.127 -0.02917 -0.298 -0.182 -0.021 0.073
6 0.202 -0.176 -0.271 -0.053 -0.00207 -0.312 -0.117 -0.067 0.175
7 0.120 -0.131 -0.232 -0.136 -0.00957 -0.213 -0.057 -0.093 0.206
8 0.055 -0.080 -0.203 -0.118 -0.02274 -0.115 0.005 -0.088 0.128
9 0.023 -0.040 -0.191 -0.038 -0.03971 -0.046 0.070 -0.065 0.024
10 0.016 -0.016 -0.186 0.043 -0.046 -0.011 0.108 -0.036 -0.058
contraction reduces prices in Boston more permanently as compared to the national
level. Unemployment rises in a permanent fashion, and income per capita is also forced
down permanently. Many of the other cities have relatively more temporary effects.
There is evidence that monetary policy does not affect municipalities in similar ways,
which corroborates Carlino and Defina’s (1998, 1999) studies concerning differential
effects on income while adding the inflation relationship among the cities.
For our study, the key is how different the reactions are from region to region. For
example, if we look at other cities, the trajectory of changes are similar. For some of the
regions, the magnitude of the changes are larger or smaller; for some regions, there are
different directions of reactions. The IRFs represent the change in these ratios rather
than how a specific home city’s reaction. Per the hypotheses of our study, this is the
point: we want to know how regional deviations from the national reactions differ from
each other. We naturally expect differences but we also want to compare city to city. It
is in that comparison where larger questions about regional volatility and AS curvature
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Figure 6: Anchorage (ANC), Atlanta (ATL) and Boston (BOS): Cumulative Response of
relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 7: Chicago (CHI), Cincinnati(CIN) and Cleveland (CLE): Cumulative Response of
relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 8: Denver (DEN), Detroit (DET) and Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW): Cumulative Re-
sponse of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 9: Honolulu (HON), Houston (HOU) and Kansas City (KCM): Cumulative Response
of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 10: Los Angeles (LAX), Miami (MIA) and Milwaukee (MIL): Cumulative Response
of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 11: Minneapolis (MIN), New York City (NYC) and Philadelphia (PHI): Cumulative
Response of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 12: Pittsburgh (PIT), Portland (POR) and San Diego (SDO): Cumulative Response
of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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Figure 13: Seattle (SEA), San Francisco (SFO) and St. Louis (STL): Cumulative Response
of relative per capita income, unemployment and inflation to an increase in ffr
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may provide ways for local areas to gauge the timing and magnitude of monetary policy
locally.
The implications of AS curvature differences are that some areas receive different
benefits from monetary policy in terms of job growth without inflation than others; as
a corollary, some areas receive more inflation without the benefits of job growth. The
relationship between price changes and unemployment changes as a result of policy is
an easy way to make conclusions about AS curvature and how different cities may have
flatter or steep curvatures. Evidence of a flatter AS curve would be price changes that
were temporary and unemployment changes that were more permanent. This is shown
in the impulse responses of such cities as CLE, CIN, HON, HOU, LAX, and PIT.
Other cities, such as ANC, BOS, DET, KCM, MIN, NYC, PHI, POR, SFO, and
STL show more inflation than change in unemployment. The remaining cities are a
mix of reactions. As an example, ATL shows no permanent effects on either prices or
unemployment after a monetary policy shock. SDO shows a change consistent with a
supply-side expansion, where prices and unemployment are both falling as the money
supply contracts; CHI, DEN, and DFW show a stagflation-like effect as a result of
a monetary contraction, where prices and unemployment rise at the same time. The
explanation for why these differences exist is vast. As in Carlino and Defina (1998,
1999), differences in policy channel and interest rate sensitivities provide answers; Flo-
rio (2005) updates Barro (1977, 1978) and suggests that aggregate supply differences
provide evidence for differential effects. It is important that policy makers consider these
explanations, especially if the Euro area intends to add more member nations in the
wake of Greece’s debt crisis and the possible problems of other, ”regional” economies.
5.2 Correlation and Comparisons
A simple correlation analysis may further illuminate connections between these cities
and their policy reactions. Using the data in the tables above, we looked for correlation
coefficients in excess of 0.8 in absolute value. There were many connections, which
is what we expect as a null hypothesis for a national monetary policy. Tables 5– 7
represent the bottom half of a symmetric, triangular matrix. A high correlation in the
reactions of different regions within a currency union is what an optimal currency area is
all about. For example, Table 7 on inflation provides the most intuitive results. Of the
possible correlations, 82 have positive correlations and none have negative correlations.
At the national level, policy makers expect policy effects to be coordinated and
correlated across regions. The results on prices partially corroborate this idea; we expect
this from policy that is focused on fighting inflation, though Anchorage, Chicago and
San Diego had no correlations over 80%. However, that is still only 27.3% of the total
possibilities. For income per capita and unemployment, the connections are slightly
different. Focusing on unemployment as a direct measure of regional labor market
connections, there are 86 correlations in excess of 80% in absolute value. However, 36 of
these connections are negative. San Diego and San Francisco lead the way with negative
correlations, which makes intuitive sense; in the 1990s and 2000s, technological booms
brought these cities strong labor markets and likely drew from many other markets as
they either recessed or were not part of the tech booms. There were only 52 correlations
larger than 80% for income per capita; San Francisco, Denver, Miami and Detroit were
negatively correlated with some cities as Table 5 shows. If the United States were an
OCA, these matrices should ave few to no blank cells.
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6 Conclusions and Discussion
The United States as an optimal currency area is at the heart of this study. Our results
suggest that monetary policy in the United States affects municipalities in a differential
manner. Using VARs to identify the parameters and impulse response functions to
estimate policy effects, this study used the ratio of consumer prices, unemployment and
per capita income in 24 cities to the national average or totals to track how different
certain cities were to others in their reactions to policy.
Because different municipalities react in different ways concerning prices and un-
employment after a monetary shock, using a national model of aggregate supply to
estimate policy effects may be erroneous. Further, policy makers may want to consider
using a disaggregated model of monetary shocks and aggregate the effects. These results
complement studies such as Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999) by expanding their conclu-
sions to the aggregate supply curve concerning differential regional effects of monetary
policy. We can expand these results by finding more home cities with price, unemploy-
ment and income data; most counties have all but prices, and it is in local inflation
where we likely learn the most about differential effects.
Our study does not cover every corner of the United States, and without price data
for every state in the United States, a true complement to the Carlino and Defina
studies is difficult. Further, our data is semi-annual and only 1990 forward. However,
it is becoming more important for policy makers to recognize regional differences in
reactions to policy. Natural extensions of this study are international, where provincial
or regional lines are generally drawn, as a test of whether our current nation-states are
themselves optimal currency areas. From this short overview of the data, it is intuitive
that a single monetary policy across a federation of city-states will result in suboptimal
responses for some economies while helping others. This issue of differential effects,
now including on local inflation rates, puts into question optimal currency areas a la
Mundell (1961). On strand for future research on differential effects may be how real
interest rates differ between cities or countries in a monetary union.
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